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Chapter 10
Standardization and Compliance Costs: Relevant
Developments at EU Level
Frank A.G. den Butter and John Hudson
Abstract This article discusses government regulation and the consequent
compliance costs for the private sector from the perspective of transaction
cost economics. In many cases, government regulation is shaped as legally
binding standards. In order to comply with these standards, private sector
firms meet various types of transaction costs, such as the bonding costs that
the principal/agent relationship of government regulation brings about. On the
other hand, good standards may reduce transaction costs. Therefore, optimal
design of government regulation requires the design of standards with the
lowest possible transaction costs. Due to network externalities and economics
of scale, and in order to guarantee a level playing field, good coordination and
unifying standards within the EU can be beneficial. This article provides
examples of such standards.
10.1 Introduction
The administrative burden stems from compliance costs imposed on business
by government. Compliance costs, in turn, are part of the more broadly defined
transaction costs. Compliance costs stem from standards, but as we will argue,
standardization may also be used to reduce transaction costs, both in the broad
sense of trade transactions and in the more narrow sense of government
regulation. Therefore, in order to understand how the administrative burden
arises, it is important to understand standardization. In this chapter, we focus
on the way (i) standardization impacts upon administrative costs, (ii) how
standardization can enhance the efficiency of regulation and (iii) how standar-
dization can be helpful in reducing transaction costs, and consequently reduce
compliance costs as part of transaction costs. The chapter proceeds as follows.
In Section 10.2, we look at ‘the economics of standards’. In Section 10.3, we
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look at standardization in the EU and in Section 10.4, specific examples of EU
standards. Section 10.5 examines the EU’s plans to control the administrative
burden and in Section 10.6, we conclude the chapter.
10.2 The Economics of Standards
1
10.2.1 Standards: A Classification
Figure 10.1 summarizes how various types of standards can be classified accord-
ing to their role in the economy. This role is encompassed more or less by the
following general definition of a standard: ‘‘A standard is the specification of the
characteristics of goods and services that provides information on the quality of
these goods and services and/or enhances their interoperability’’. The classifica-
tion of standards is necessarily somewhat fuzzy as the characteristics may differ
in different circumstances, which makes a clear separation of roles impossible.
The first distinction made in Figure 10.1 is between public and private
standards. This classification refers to the way standards originate. Is the
market responsible for their development, or was it a government initiative?
The government has the ability to make the standards mandatory through the
introduction of legislation. This is in contrast to voluntary standards. A further
distinction is that between standards that are related to products and those
related to production processes. A problem is that, often, the question whether
a product meets a standard can only be answered by an inspection of the
production process. This can be very costly, for both business and governments,
particularly when the products are not produced domestically. This poses










Fig. 10.1 Classification of standards
1 Parts of this section are based on Den Butter et al. (2007a,b).
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services), and may be a reason for international harmonization (e.g. within the
EU) of standards. The third categorization of Fig. 10.1 relates to the difference
between internal and external standards. Internal standards are subject to the
control of companies that set them; external standards are to be considered as
given for individual companies. In fact, regulatory standards will always be
external standards. Yet they may result in the setting or upgrading of internal
standards in a firm, in order to comply with the external regulatory standard.
10.2.2 Reduction of Transaction Costs Through Standards
It has already been mentioned that standards can contribute to the reduction of
transaction costs (seeWilliamson, 1998; North, 1990, 1994) and therefore, more
specifically, to the reduction of the administrative burden. It holds both for
specialization and coordination of tasks within firms and for transactions at the
market level. The more production processes are specialized and split up in
various parts, the more coordination is needed and the more important it
becomes to reduce transaction costs by means of standardization. On the
other hand, a reduction in transaction costs by making better use of standards
will promote a further fragmentation of the production process as compliance
to these standards becomes less costly. An important reason why standards
reduce transaction costs is that standards tend to reduce insecurity and infor-
mation problems. In the literature, the best known effects of standards are
network externalities and a reduction of switching costs (Blind, 2004). Standar-
dization also increases the exportability of products, which facilitates econo-
mies of scale.
10.2.2.1 Typology of Transaction Costs
In principle, two types of transaction costs can be distinguished: ‘‘Hard’’ or direct
transaction costs and ‘‘Soft’’ or indirect transaction costs. Hard transaction costs
relate to costs that are readily perceptible and quantifiable, such as transport
charges, import levies and customs authorities’ tariffs. Soft transaction costs are
muchmore difficult to observe andmeasure. One can think of all kinds of costs of
making and checking contracts, information costs, costs because of cultural
differences and communication failures, tacit knowledge on legal procedures,
formation of trust and reputation, network building, costs associated with risks
and with rules and regulation in order to reduce risks, security requirements etc.
These are of particular relevance for administrative costs.
10.2.2.2 Standards and Market Failure
In general, government intervention, and this includes the area of standards,
can only be justified in the presence of market failure. Asymmetric information,
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which is a form of incomplete information, can be a cause of such market
failure. It relates to a situation where the buyer cannot observe the quality or
specific characteristics of products. Akerlof (1970) gives the example of the
secondhand car salesman. The buyer does not know the quality of car, so that,
as a consequence, the bad cars (to speak in Akerlof’s terms, the ‘‘lemons’’) are
crowding the good cars (‘‘peaches’’) out of the market. In this case, asymmetric
information reduces the supply of good quality products. When asymmetric
information results in the inability of consumers to include some relevant aspects
of the product in their buying decision, it is possible that only products that
score low on these aspects are offered on the market, since they cost less (WTO,
2005). This can be undesirable, and therefore, albeit under conditions, can be a
legitimate ground for government intervention.
10.2.2.3 Standards and Trust
Trust is an important mechanism that enables the reduction of transaction
costs, especially in the frequent cases of incomplete and/or asymmetric infor-
mation. In such cases, contracts can never be complete, and trust will always
play a role somewhere in the transaction process (Den Butter andMosch, 2003;
Mosch, 2004). Standards may very much contribute to such formation of trust.
The reputation and reliability of the quality labels have to be built up slowly,
because the formation of a trustworthy reputation will need some time.
Explaining the standard and what it stands for to its users on the one hand, as
well as adequate supervision, and careful development of a reputation of trust
and reliability on the other hand, are needed to make the standard a success.
Trust in standards will also contribute to the reduction of compliance costs
when it enhances the intrinsic motivation to comply with the standard.
10.2.3 Why Should Governments Bother About Setting
Standards for Regulation?
The previous discussion on the relationship between standardization and trans-
action costs (including compliance costs) suggests that government intervention
in standardization can be needed in specific cases. Leaving the development of
standards entirely to the market can sometimes result in solutions that are
suboptimal from the perspective of social welfare. The existence of market failure
is a necessary – though certainly not sufficient – condition for government
intervention. Mandatory standards can help with many of the aspects of market
failure. Firstly, they result in the removal from the market of all products that do
not comply with the minimum standard. Voluntary standards in combination
with labeling can provide buyers with sufficient information on quality differ-
ences in a situation where both low and high quality products are supplied.
Negative labels can be made mandatory by the government for producers of
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goods that do not comply with a standard. Positive labeling is used by firms to
enable the consumer to distinguish (often more expensive) products that comply
with high standards. Therefore, standards can reduce, or even take away, the
problem of asymmetric information identified by Akerlof, reducing the transac-
tion costs as they enable more and better transactions. This also benefits the
reputable firm, particularly ones selling high quality products, who gain from
reduced signaling costs and consumer uncertainty.
Apart from internalizing negative externalities, it is especially through redu-
cing information problems that the government can benefit society. This can be
done by the introduction of a quality label that provides the user with informa-
tion on several relevant aspects. Such a multidimensional quality label facilitates
the supply of products with various quality levels. This system aims at promoting
product differentiation which enhances consumer welfare. Although such a
standard does no longer imply a unified set of minimum requirements that all
products should comply with, it can still be regarded as a standard. Joining this
type of standard can be voluntary or mandatory. It is very likely that producers
who have a low score on certain dimensionswill not voluntarily join the standard,
in the hope that consumers will expect an average quality of the product in the
absence of information. This can be undesirable. Therefore, the EU-energy label,
for example, is mandatory and must be used by all producers.
The government can also standardize its own services. Such standardization
may lead to a considerable reduction of compliance costs when these standards
relate to government regulation (e.g. in the case of permits) A special case
relates to services provided to multinational organizations. These organizations
often have to take all sorts of differences in rules and legislation that exist
between different countries into account. This can bring about high transaction
costs for them. Especially small countries with legislation that differs substan-
tially from that of other nations will make themselves less attractive to multi-
nationals. Harmonization and less complexity can enhance the ability of a
nation to attract foreign investments. An example is harmonization and redu-
cing transaction costs with respect to customs regulation, where many changes
already have been made through the WCO (World Customs Organization).
10.2.4 Transaction Costs of Government Regulation
The transaction costs of the implementation of government policy result from the
principal/agent (agency) in policy implementation. Here the government acts as
principal and the citizens and businesses as agents. In this situation, three types of
costs can be distinguished which are all part of the total transaction costs of
government regulation. The first type of cost is the costs for the government itself.
These are, in the principal/agent terminology, the monitoring costs. Part of
these are administration costs, but there are also additional costs which come
with the design of the regulatory measures. Therefore, the implementation costs
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for the government are generally considerably higher than the amounts which
appear in the budget (payment of subsidies, receipts of levies). The additional
costs include salaries of the civil servants engaged in policy preparation, imple-
mentation of regulatory measures and other monitoring activities. Costs also
relate to subsidies which are not granted, and allowances for tax exemptions.
The second type of costs is the bonding costs for the citizens and businesses.
These consist mainly of compliance costs, which are the focus of this volume.
Here, all compliance costs of the laws and legislation by the government should
be taken into account. They are the direct financial costs of levies, but also capital
investments and all other remaining costs needed to meet the obligations of laws
and legislation. These compliance costs also include the costs of informing the
government (sheer bonding costs), which can be regarded as the administrative
costs in a strict sense. The policy debate on diminishing the administrative burden
of government regulation usually focuses on these costs only. Calculating total
compliance costs can, however, be rather complicated. For instance, when firms
are to meet the requirements of environment legislation or of safety regulations,
they have to make all kinds of investments in the production processes and
management procedures of the firm. These costs can only be partly counted as
transaction costs of government policy, as some of these investment costs would
be made anyhow from the firm’s own commercial perspective. So, there is a need
to separate these kinds of compliance costs into external compliance costs, which
are added to the transaction costs, and internal compliance costs, which are not
transaction costs originating from government regulation. Of course, such a split
between external and internal compliance costs has, to some extent, an arbitrary
character and requires a good insight into the management of the firm. Boog and
Nijsen (2007) provide an example of how to calculate these various types of
compliance costs for specific cases.
The third type of cost is much more difficult to quantify, namely the societal
costs of the residual loss. These arise because the reaction of the agents to
government regulation will never be in complete agreement with the objectives
of the government. The difference is the residual loss. Principal/agent contracts
should be designed in such a way that the total agency costs (monitoring costs,
bonding costs and residual loss) should be minimized. It implies that agency
contracts should not try to reduce residual losses as much as possible, nor
should they seek to minimize costs for the government. There should be a
good balance between all three types of costs.
The above discussion shows that the principal/agent theory provides an
adequate framework for a taxonomy and further categorization of the transac-
tion costs of implementing government regulation. Total transaction costs of
government regulation consist of the netted sum of the three components. The
expression netted sum indicates that (for e.g.) subsidies granted by the govern-
ment to private agents are counted as costs by the government, but should be
subtracted from the costs incurred by the private agents for obtaining the subsidy
and the bonding costs met by these agents to demonstrate to the government that
the subsidy is well spent. A similar netting of costs holds in the case of regulatory
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levies, which are costs for the private agents but are to be subtracted from the
administrative costs and othermonitoring costs that the governmentmakeswhen
raising the levies. It should, by the way, be noted that in case of regulatory levies,
private agents who are subjected to these levies, face higher costs than the sheer
amount of the levies. There are additional compliance costs associated with the
regulation of the levy, which also have the character of regulatory costs. This
aspect is often neglected in decisions about the size of the levies.
Government attempts at minimizing total implementation costs do not come
solely from the government. In order to obtain an optimal result, coordination
and consultation with stakeholders is needed. This is especially in line with the
tradition of compromise and consensus in the Dutch polder model. Such con-
sultation should be institutionalized. It can take place in so-called ‘‘matching
zones’’ which are meetings of relevant stakeholders in a specific setting and with
a specific agenda in order to come to a low cost compromise. In the principal/
agent terminology, these meetings can be seen as the (virtual or actual) meeting
place between the principal and the agents, with the purpose, as far as possible,
of aligning goals and reducing monitoring and bonding costs. Also important is
the choice of participants in these meetings. On the one hand, all interested
parties should be represented in the matching zone, but on the other hand, the
coordination task should not become too complex. Discussions and consensus
formation in these meetings should be restricted to specific regulatory measures
and standardization per se and should not be blurred by side issues which can
be discussed elsewhere. This problem of forming an optimal composition of
participants in the meetings is comparable to that of the optimum scope for
administrative entities. In theNetherlands, some (positive) experience with such
matching zones was obtained in the field of the implementation and compliance
with tax legislation (the Van Lunteren commission). Such stakeholder discus-
sions can also be valuable for the government as they may reveal contradictory
legislation from different government departments.
10.3 Standards and Standardization in the EU
10.3.1 The New Approach: In pursuit of the Single Market
In the EU, the choice of standards rather than directives initially stemmed from
the difficulties encountered by European institutions in imposing compulsory
measures (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000). The recourse to standards was
therefore a pragmatic response to the absence of any constraining means at
the EU’s disposal to accompany its regulatory activity and to make the single
market an economic reality. Standards facilitate cross border trade and give
consumers, and indeed firms, confidence in the quality, safety and specification
of goods that comply with those standards. They also reduce search costs which
are particularly high for consumers thinking of buying products imported from
other countries.
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The ‘New Approach’ to standards and regulation in Europe was intended to
limit the regulatory function of the Commission and Council to specifying ‘essen-
tial requirements’ that producers must meet in terms of safety, health, environ-
mental and consumer protection. Theoretically, at least, thesewere to be voluntary.
Responsibility for developing standards was given to the European Standards
Organizations (ESOs). This has led to the proliferation of ‘voluntary standards’
that give products conformity with essential EU directives and thus access to EU
markets (Mattli, 2001). However, the need for such access means that in reality,
they are not voluntary (Blind, 2004). This lack of clarity raises the possibility that
they may be omitted from calculations of the administrative burden.
10.3.2 The EU Standards Architecture: CEN/CENELEC
and ETSI
There are three main ESOs: (i) CENELEC, (ii) ETSI, and (iii) CEN. CENELEC
prepares ‘voluntary’ electrotechnical standards and ETSI (the European Tele-
communications Standards Institute) produces telecommunications standards.
CEN, the European Committee for Standardization, focuses on voluntary tech-
nical standards which promote free trade, the safety of workers and consumers,
the interoperability of networks, environmental protection, the exploitation of
research and development programs, and public procurement. It is, for example,
responsible for air traffic management standards, automotive fuel standards,
common structural rules for the design of buildings, the safety of consumer
products, solid biofuels, food, healthcare, the conservation of cultural property,
etc. Of the three ESOs, it is mainly CEN who produce standards which impact
upon the administrative burden. The Technical Committees (TCs), of which there
are currently 275 active ones in CEN alone, play a key role in standard develop-
ment. The TCs draw on expertise from associated standard bodies which are
generally organized by European industry associations (Goerke and Holler,
1998). This too is a cost to business related to regulation, but one which is seldom
considered. The standards bodies tend to emphasise consensus, but as final voting
is based on a qualified majority, this is more of a subjective than an objective
concept. Thus, it is possible that countries have to accept as their national
standard something they voted against.
10.4 Examples of European Standards
10.4.1 Examples of European Standards: Packaging
and Distribution of Drugs
The Dutch plant of the multinational drugs companyMerck, Sharpe & Dohme
(MSD) provides an example of how internal and external standards can affect
corporate management. MSD Netherlands delivers drugs of the mother
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company to customers and regions all over the world. The Dutch plant coordi-
nates the logistics, packs the drugs, and makes sure that all rules and legislative
requirements have been met. Within MSD, there used to exist an enormous
diversity in packages. Thus, MSD developed an internal standard to reduce
packing costs, by – for example – using one package for a group of regions.
However, standardization of external regulations, which in the case of drugs are
set by the EU, national governments and health organizations, is also impor-
tant for MSD. MSD has to deal with many different prescriptions in various
countries with respect to packaging and distribution of drugs. Obviously,
increased harmonization would considerably reduce their transaction costs.
Harmonization could also be beneficial to public health when the harmonized
standards would imply the use of best practices with respect to information on
drugs contained in the package. However, up to now, the EU rules for packa-
ging of drugs only provide limited costs advantages to MSD as the individual
member states are not fully complying with the EU regulations or have specific
local regulations. Nonetheless, the EU is moving in the direction of more
uniform regulation in this respect. For example, the European Directorate for
the Quality of Medicines and Health Care (EDQM) was set up in 1996 and part
of its current mission is to establish and provide official standards for the
manufacture and quality control of medicines. Such standards relate to both
reducing transaction costs and correcting for market failure.
10.4.2 Examples of European Standards: Food
and Product Quality
The EU has an integrated approach to food safety which is designed to ensure
effective control systems and compliance with EU standards (Hudson and
Hudson, 2008). This covers how farmers produce food, how it is processed,
how it is sold and the nature of the information provided on the labeling. The
rationale for this lies partly with concerns, partly about health and public safety
and partly about facilitating the single market. Underpinning this approach are
more than 400 standards developed by CEN in the area of food safety alone as
well as others related to general product quality. The European Food Safety
Authority (EFSA) was set up in 2002 following aWhite Paper recommendation
of 2000 and partly in response to food health scares such as ‘mad cow’ disease or
BSE (Ugland and Veggeland, 2006). Its role is currently restricted to risk
assessment and risk communication to interested parties and the public at
large. The EU has recently been considering the role of regulation in protecting
consumers and the need to strike a balance between a high level
of competitiveness and consumer protection.2 In part, as always, their concern
2 More generally, consumer protection is about making sure that all consumer products are
safe and that consumer rights are properly protected, that consumers have the information
they need to make a judgment and are not misled.
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is based on the need to promote trade and competition within the single
market. Current legislation allows member states to adopt more stringent
regulations – i.e. ‘minimum harmonization’. This has resulted in added cost
to businesses as they attempt to trade over borders and also increased consumer
uncertainty about buying products from other EU countries. Within the
context of Section 10.2, these standards correct for market failure and facilitate
trust, as do those relating to waste.
10.4.3 Examples of European Standards: Waste Disposal
Standards
TheWEEE regulations make producers of Electrical and Electronic Equipment
(EEE) responsible for these products when they become waste. The aims of
the WEEE directive include, e.g., (i) to reduce WEEE disposal to landfill,
(ii) provide for a free producer take-back scheme for consumers for end of life
equipment, and (iii) to set and achieve targets for recovery, reuse and recycling
of different classes of WEEE. At the moment, transposition of the WEEE
directive into national law has revealed major differences from one legal system
to another. Thus, it is being recommended that the Directive should be revised
to increase harmonization (Savage, 2006). Related to WEEE is the RoHS
Directive connected with Restrictions of Hazardous Substances in Electrical
and Electronic Equipment which, from 2006, put limits on the maximum
permitted level of lead, mercury, cadmium, etc. in a product. As is often the
case, underpinning this work on RoHS, WEEE and the environment in general
is the work of a number of ESO technical committees. For example, CENELEC
technical committee TX 111X has developed standard EN 50419: 2006 dealing
with the marking of electrical and electronic equipment in accordance with the
WEEE directive. All of this puts obligations on firms which they both have to
meet and be able to prove they have met.
10.4.4 Examples of European Standards: EU Standards
for Financial Transactions in the Capital Markets
According to data from the BIS in 2005, financial transactions in worldwide
capital markets amounted to about 1400 trillion dollars. It appears that the
direct costs of handling these financial transactions between EUMember States
are two to six times as high as in the US. The European Commission aims
at reducing the costs of these transactions to a level similar to that in the
US (Giovannini, 2001). However, the trading of financial assets involves trans-
action costs which go far beyond the direct and easily quantifiable trading costs.
For example, The London Stock Exchange (LSE, 2002) has calculated that the
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formation of a European clearing and settlement platform can incur a saving in
direct transaction costs of E 1.6 billion. But, estimates of the potential cost
savings on indirect costs vary from E 5 billion to E 40 billion per year. The
successful completion of a transaction depends to a large extent on the quality
of the transaction and speed of communication. However, besides institutional
reforms, there is an obvious need for better standardization of the handling of
financial asset transactions at the level of the EU.Here, due to differences of the
types and sizes of the various stock exchange markets between the EU and the
US, a mere copy of the American way of regulation at the EU level seems
unwarranted.
Compared to the EU, US asset trade is much more specialized in specific
financial products and derivatives, and has large trade turnovers. This specia-
lization (in niche markets) increases the ’asset specificity’ of the trade and
necessitates specialist knowledge of how to trade these financial products and
derivatives. It increases, in principle, the transaction costs but in offering
opportunities for professionals to exploit economies of scale in trading large
volumes, it may also reduce transaction costs. In the EU, there is also some kind
of ‘asset specificity’ in the financial assets trade but it has a different character
than in the US. Here, there are mainly national differences in property rights
and regulations that lead to product differentiation. This increases the transac-
tion costs in the EU. Therefore, the EU should develop its own standard on the
basis of product harmonization in order to reduce transaction costs. A design
for an EU standard which reckons with these differences is given by Den Butter
and Corveleijn (2007). This is clearly an example of a standard whose prime
purpose is to reduce transaction costs.
10.5 EU Regulation of Standards in the EU
10.5.1 The Adoption of the Dutch Model Throughout the EU
The growth of standards has contributed to the growth of the administrative
burden and this has led to growing concern in the EU, as well as in some
individual countries. Thus, onMarch 23, 2005 the European Council requested
‘‘the Commission and the Council to consider a common methodology for
measuring administrative burdens’’. The approach proposed by the Commis-
sion is based on the Dutch SCM methodology, discussed elsewhere in this
volume. It is proposed to use the same core equations, the same relevant cost
parameters and the same formulas for expressing the frequency of administra-
tive activities and the same approach in the assessment of the performance of a
‘‘normally efficient entity’’.
The EU has estimated that administrative costs by member states are as in
Table 10.1. The EU has calculated that a reduction in the administrative
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burden by 25% would eventually lead to an increase in EU GDP of 1.6%
(COM, 2006).
The source of the administrative burden arises from four different levels:
(i) international, (ii) EU, (iii) national, (iv) sub-national. The split shown in
Table 10.2 suggests that the most important source of burden comes from
national governments, although this may be changing as the EU expands its
regulatory activities. Specifying where the burden originates can be difficult.
Often, a measure originates at, say, EU level to be implemented at national and
then sub-national level. Often too, the original impetus would come from an
international standards agency such as ISO. At each stage of the chain, there is
the potential to add to the original obligation, a process termed ‘gold plating’.
International law always needs ‘transposition’. This is also the case for EU
Directives, but not EU Regulations which are directly applicable.
The EU’s role is a twofold one; first, in controlling its own administrative
burden, and secondly persuading all the member states to follow. At the
moment, there is enthusiasm amongst some member states to do this and the
Netherlands, Denmark, the Czech Republic and the UK are well down this
path. But other states appear less enthusiastic, and without EU pressure, would
probably only make limited progress. As such, the EU Commission has set a
target for the whole of the EU to reduce administrative costs by 25%. In
addition, it is envisaged that targets will also be set in specific policy areas
where both the administrative burden is particularly heavy and there is the
Table 10.1 Administrative costs by member states as a share of GDP
Austria 4.6% Ireland 2.4%
Belgium & Luxembourg 2.8% Italy 4.6%
Netherlands 3.7%
Czech Republic 3.3% Poland 5.0%
Germany 1.9% Portugal 4.6%
Denmark 1.9% RE* 6.8%
Spain 4.6% Slovakia 4.6%
Finland 1.5% Slovenia 4.1%
France 3.7% Sweden 1.5%
UK 1.5% EU25 3.5%
Hungary 2.4%
*RE combines the Baltic member states, Malta and Cyprus.
Source: COM (2006) 691 Final, based on Kox (2005).
Table 10.2 The Distribution of Administrative Costs in Denmark and the Netherlands
Share of administrative costs by origin of legislation Denmark Netherlands
Originates directly in international law 28% 43%
International origin but implemented nationally 15% 13%
National Origin 57% 44%
Source: COM (2006) 691 Final, based on Denmark and Netherlands baseline
measurement
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potential for significant cuts. The EU believes these figures are reasonable and
cite results from the four states that have carried out baseline measurements
that there is a potential for reductions of this size by focusing on costs originat-
ing with both the EU and at the national level. It is also worth emphasizing that
three of these four countries have costs below the EU average, as shown in
Table 10.1 and one assumes that if a 25% reduction is feasible for these states,
then still more could be expected from certain other countries.
10.6 Summary and Conclusions
In the EU, many of the standards and regulations have grown in recent years
due to factors such as technical change and rising expectations. Technical
change means that products can be produced today which were not previously
possible, but the health and safety of products such as mobile phones and GM
foods need to be regulated. Rising expectations mean that we have legislation
now which we did not have previously simply because we now demand more
from products and production processes. But not all the trends are adverse. The
development of the computer and the internet will have substantially reduced
the compliance costs of e.g. collecting VAT for the government. The growth of
EU and international standards will have reduced, and reduced considerably,
the administrative costs to firms associated with international trade. None-
theless, it is probably true that the pressures on the administrative burden will
tend upwards in the coming years. This means that if it is a target of government
policy to stabilize or even reduce that burden, then finding more efficient ways
of doing things, rather than doing fewer things is probably essential, although
particular attention needs to be focused on the work of the ESOs to ensure that
new standards imposing obligations on business are genuinely necessary.
Standards and associated regulatory activity represent a cost on business,
but it is not a cost without benefits for both society and for firms. In terms of
society, standards which ensure product quality, particularly related to safety,
provide a clear benefit to consumers in correcting for market failure as outlined
in Section 10.2. But they also benefit the firm in several ways. First, in addres-
sing the problem of asymmetric information, they provide a guarantee to the
consumer that they can buy goods with confidence; this will economize on
individual search costs, possibly expand the market and also potentially allow
firms to economize on signaling expenditure (Jones and Hudson, 1996). More-
over, firms too benefit from such guarantees. In agriculture, for example, they
reduce the spread of infectious diseases amongst livestock. Again, within the
context of market failure, other standards and regulatory activity ensure the
health and safety of the workforce. This too is an advantage to society, but also
to the good employers who do not have to unfairly compete against firms with
less rigorous standards. Thus, the design and institutional set-up of government
regulation should be such that total transaction costs, i.e. compliance costs for
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the private sector, implementation and control costs for the regulator and
(indirect) costs for society should be minimized. It implies ‘‘efficient’’ regulation
and not necessarily deregulation, as insufficient regulation or laxity in execution
of regulation may bring about high societal costs in the long run, e.g. because of
costly accidents and loss of faith and trust in government. It must also take into
account that some regulation and standards can reduce transaction costs
for business. Hence, the view that no new regulation can be brought in unless
some other burden disappears in many cases is almost certainly wrong and, if
followed through, would expose society to unnecessary risk.
Because of this, the next stage in the process of controlling the administrative
burden may well be one of measuring not just the ‘gross burden’ but the net one
too. That is measuring both the costs and the benefits. A proper cost/benefit
analysis should be a major element in the discussion on the administrative costs
of regulation. In case of new regulations or standards, the benefits should
exceed the costs, and the regulation should be designed in such a way that,
given the warranted scope of regulation, costs should be minimized. Obviously,
these costs do not only comprise administrative costs in a narrow sense, but
include all kinds of transaction costsmentioned in Section 10.2. Inclusion of these
(often soft and difficult to measure) transaction costs in the Dutch SCM meth-
odology seems warranted in order to enhance the quality of thatmethodology. In
addition, it shows that a target of, say, merely reducing administrative costs by
25%can be suboptimal from the perspective of welfare economics. In those cases,
where actual deregulation is warranted, i.e. a relaxation of rules and restrictions
or of quality standards set to products and production processes, again, a full
fledged cost/benefit analysis is in order. Here, the loss of benefits to society of
regulation, e.g. of allowing for higher risks or being less strict on internalizing
negative externalities, should be smaller than the gains in terms of less transaction
costs. However, in as much as the focus is on transaction costs affecting business,
it should be on all transaction costs and not just those imposed by government.
Hence, if transaction costs are high because of market failure, then government
action in reducing the extent of this market failure is as valid an area of concern
as reducing the administrative burden per se. Standards impose transaction costs
on business, but equally some standards can reduce transaction costs whilst
simultaneously benefiting society as a whole. This has been shown in our analysis
of the financial and pharmaceutical industries.
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